CiteWeb id: 19980000159

CiteWeb score: 3798

Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centered not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioral programs. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions that can alter the basis of their success, i.e., to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions that punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms. Comprehensive treatment of ecological and game theoretic dynamics Invasion dynamics and permanence as key concepts Explanation in terms of games of things like competition between species

The publication "Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics" is placed in the Top 10000 of the best publications in CiteWeb. Also in the category Mathematics it is included to the Top 1000. Additionally, the publicaiton "Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics" is placed in the Top 1000 among other scientific works published in 1998.
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