Autors:

CiteWeb id: 19830000019

CiteWeb score: 9195

DOI: 10.1086/261155

This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.

The publication "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity" is placed in the Top 1000 of the best publications in CiteWeb. Also in the category Economics it is included to the Top 100. Additionally, the publicaiton "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity" is placed in the Top 100 among other scientific works published in 1983.
Links to full text of the publication: